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Abstract 
Indigenous firms in developing countries with large domestic markets have unique 
advantages:  the low-end provides “natural” protection from foreign competition, while 
higher-end segments provide incentives for foreign firms to localize activities and 
develop channels for future capability-building.  Paradoxically, in their eagerness to 
support development efforts of local firms, states often nullify these advantages and 
limit the opportunities and capabilities that local firms can leverage in the upgrading 
process.  Using the case studies of three large industrial sectors in China that faced 
similar prospects but had widely different outcome, this paper develops a framework for 
understanding how policy shapes the growth and segmentation of markets, and thus the 
opportunity for industrial upgrading of indigenous firms.  The cases show how 
restrictive demand- and the supply-side policies often inadvertently limited the 
opportunities for upgrading through their effect on the availability of know-how, inputs 
and resources required for industrial upgrading (the supply-side), and through their 
effect on the incentives for upgrading (the demand-side).  Given that each segment is a 
crucial rung on the development ladder, industrial upgrading efforts stall when state 
policy inadvertently knocked out rungs on the development ladder. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Understanding the relationship between foreign and indigenous innovation in developing 
countries has long been a central focus of the development literature.  The relationship is often 
portrayed as treacherous:  states seek to draw on the knowledge and skills that can be gained 
from foreign firms, while at the same time avoid becoming overly dependent on them.1 This has 
been particularly true in the context of export-led growth where foreign firms with advanced 
technologies have obvious advantages in selling to developed markets.  
In recent years, scholars have asked whether emerging economies with large domestic 
markets might have special advantages in navigating the relationship with foreign firms because 
they are not as dependent on export markets (Zhou 2008; Brandt and Thun 2010; Fu and Gong 
2011).  Within their home market, indigenous firms have more appropriate technology, products, 
and knowledge for more price sensitive low-end segments of the market, while foreign firms 
have an advantage in the high-end segments.  Over time, the large and rapidly growing middle-
segments of the market provide incentives for both sets of firms to depart from their competitive 
strengths and to invest in the capabilities required to “fight for the middle” segments of the 
market (Brandt and Thun 2010; see also Herrigel et al. 2013).  Competing at home may offer 
opportunities that global markets do not.  
Although a large domestic market provides potential opportunity for indigenous firms, 
there are no guarantees.  China, for instance, has enjoyed productivity growth in manufacturing 
over the last 15 years that has been as high if not higher than rates observed in Japan, Taiwan or 
Korea over similar periods in their development (Brandt et al. 2012), however the role of 
indigenous Chinese firms within sectors varies widely.  In some sectors, domestic firms are 
rapidly becoming globally competitive and gaining market share, while in others they continue to 
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be dominated by foreign firms (Brandt and Thun 2010).  Similarly, in the case of Brazil, there 
are sectors where indigenous firms have benefitted from the large domestic market (e.g. furniture 
and footwear, see Navas-Alemán 2011) but also sectors where they have failed to do so (e.g. 
machine tools, see Alcorta 2000).  
In order to understand the dynamics of the increasing number of emerging economies 
that have both large scale and rapid growth (Nadvi 2014; Sinkovics et al. 2014), it is necessary to 
shift attention from the traditional supply-side focus of an export-led growth model towards an 
understanding of how domestic demand in conjunction with local supply factors shapes the 
opportunities for indigenous firms.  Just as a basketball team with several seven-footers is likely 
to employ different tactics than a team of more modestly-sized players, a large emerging market 
has a range of policy options that smaller markets do not.   
  In this paper, we compare three Chinese manufacturing sectors—autos, heavy 
construction equipment, and motorcycles—that in principle offered similar opportunities for 
domestic firms to advance because technologies were relatively mature and domestic markets 
were huge and rapidly growing, but in only one of which has domestic firms succeeded.  While 
Chinese construction equipment firms have rapidly narrowed the gap with multinationals in key 
market segments, in autos and motorcycles, huge differences persist and appear to be widening. 
  We argue that these outcomes are largely a product of differences in how state policy 
shapes the “fight for the middle” dynamic articulated in Brandt and Thun (2010).  In a large 
emerging market, government policy influences the opportunities for upgrading not only through 
their effect on the availability of know-how, inputs and resources required for industrial 
upgrading (the supply-side), but also through their effect on the incentives for upgrading (the 
demand-side).  When growth in a developing country is export-led, the supply-side is typically 
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the crucial concern for policy-makers, largely because the demand-side is determined by global 
markets rather than national policy.  With domestic-led growth, the two sides are equally 
important and highly complementary; moreover, policy choices made on one side of the equation 
often have unanticipated consequences on the other side.  For example, policies used to mobilize 
resources on the supply-side to help serve certain segments might inadvertently constrain 
domestic demand in other critical market segments; conversely, policies used to limit/boost 
demand in key market segments might limit the supply of firms, technology, inputs and/or skills 
that are essential for future industrial upgrading.   
Governments often take an active role in the development process, and the signs of an 
activist state can be found in each of our case studies. What is critical here is that policy-makers 
should take care not to nullify the natural advantages that come with a large domestic market.   A 
large, contested low-end segment, for example, can protect domestic firms as effectively as tariff 
protection and does not carry the difficulty of having to know when the infant industry stage has 
passed.  Related, a large higher-end segment provides incentives for foreign firms to localize 
activities more effectively than stringent local content requirements, which are usually all too 
easily evaded.   Given that each segment of the market plays a crucial role in the development 
process, our analysis suggests that the objective should be to implement “segment-neutral” 
policies that do not knock out rungs of the developmental ladder.    
In the next section of the paper we use the concept of quality ladders to refine our 
conception of how domestic Chinese and foreign firms compete, link this to the innovation and 
upgrading literature, and explain the relationship to policy.  The third section is an explanation of 
our methodology.  In each subsequent section, we show how policy influences the structure of 
the quality ladders in each sector, and how this related to the opportunities and/or constraints 
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indigenous firms faced during the development process.  As might be expected in sectors in 
which the upgrading process is largely incremental and unfolds over the course of decades, 
history matters:  the roots of the differences between sectors lie in important policy choices in the 
1980s and 1990s, the full consequences of which we see clearly today.  A penultimate section 
extends the argument to cases of telecommunications, and wind turbines.  In the conclusion we 
return to the implications for policy.    
 
2.  Constructing a Ladder 
Our starting point is an examination of how firms from developing and developed 
economies compete.  Differentiation on the basis of product quality plays a central role, a 
dynamic captured in the economics literature by the notion of quality ladders.2   
In a product market, firms compete through vertical product differentiation, with each 
firm deciding the level of quality to supply on the basis of their own capability, input costs, and 
the price consumers are willing to pay for each individual level of quality (performance).3 In this 
setting a ladder in quality emerges—higher rungs, higher quality, and higher prices—with firms 
producing the highest quality typically enjoying the highest profits.  Because of better access to 
human resources, capital and technology, richer countries have an advantage in producing higher 
quality products, while lower labor costs provide poorer countries a competitive advantage in 
manufacturing lower quality-less expensive versions of the same products.  The length of the 
ladder in a product market will depend on the premium that consumers put on quality 
(Khandewal 2010). 
Our focus is on the ability of firms to produce and capture market share in successively 
more demanding and higher quality product segments within a sector.  Over time, movement up 
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the quality ladder is critical for firms in developing countries in order to escape the intense 
competition characteristic of low-end markets where barriers to entry are low.4  These pressures 
are compounded by the fact that success in lower-end product segments eventually leads to rising 
wages for firms, while rising incomes gradually reduce the demand for low-end products. In 
endogenous models of economic growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1991), firms with market 
power invest in R&D and innovative activity in order to move up the quality ladder and thereby 
escape the impact of competition lower down the quality ladder on firm profits.   
Although there are instances when firms in a developing country might “leapfrog” those 
that came before, the development literature has long emphasized the importance of learning 
from earlier developers and making incremental changes and improvements to existing 
technologies in the context of relatively mature industries (Gerschenkron 1962; Amsden 1989; 
Wade 1990; Bernard and Ravenhill 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999; Amsden and Chu 2003).  
Innovation in this tradition is not the radical innovation that leads to new-to-the world products, 
but is a process of gradual and relatively minor changes that cumulatively become important 
(Dosi 1982; Henderson and Clark 1990; Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995; Geroski 2003).  
This was the process through which firms in Japan (Womack et al. 1990), Taiwan (Chen 2009), 
and Korea (Amsden 1989) moved into higher value-added activities, and it has been identified as 
the dominant form of innovation in China (Breznitz and Murphree 2011).  In many more cases, 
of course, incremental innovation fails to be a mechanism for movement up the quality ladder.     
 
Export-led Growth 
The starting point for much of the literature seeking to explain the successful cases of 
“catch-up” growth in East Asia is twofold:  first, there is a large technological gap between local 
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firms and global leaders; and second, there is a gap in the knowledge local firms have about the 
export-markets that they are targeting (Hobday 1995; Cimoli et al. 2006; Schmitz 2007). 
In the developmental state literature, the primary focus is on how state policy enables 
firms to overcome constraints on the supply-side.   The state mobilizes resources, lowers the risk 
of investment, and selectively allocates resources to domestic firms that meet performance 
targets, usually in export markets (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999; Amsden 
2001).  Promotion of licensing deals with foreign firms, public research institutes, and broader 
S&T policies open up channels of learning within the domestic economy.  A core theme in this 
literature is explaining why some states are able to develop the institutions that are able to take 
on an effective coordination role and others are not (Evans 1995; Haggard 2004; Kohli 2004).  
In the global value chain and innovation literature, multinational firms play a more 
prominent role in transmitting knowledge on the supply-side—through joint ventures (JVs), 
supply chains, and original equipment manufacturing (OEM) sourcing arrangements—but there 
is also an emphasis on learning from buyers.  In Korea, Hobday argues, “buyers provided local 
companies with blueprints and specifications, information on competing goods, production 
techniques as well as feedback on design, quality and performance.”  The early experience as 
OEM and original design manufacturer (ODM) suppliers allowed these firms to improve process 
skills, acquire the scale that made investments in new technology possible, and gain new design 
skills (Hobday 1995:  1177-1178).  The form of insertion in a global value chain and the type of 
value chain can be key determinants of the breadth of opportunity for learning (Gereffi 1994; 
Schmitz and Knorringa 1999; Gereffi et al. 2005).  
In the economics literature, a major focal point has been on measuring the contribution of 
learning-through-exporting to the improvement of firm productivity and upgrading.  
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Considerable empirical support exists for the role of this channel for firms from developing 
countries (Harrison and Rodriquez-Clare 2010; Du et al. 2012), but the exact size as well as the 
mechanisms through which learning and upgrading occurs remains a black box.  Issues of 
selection of better firms into exporting, as well as simultaneous changes in firm product mix, 
mark-ups and input costs complicate estimation (Atkin et al. 2014).  
In the export-led model of development, firms largely learn what customers want in 
overseas markets through the act of exporting.  Because the structure of the quality ladder is 
defined by the export markets however, the demand-side remains beyond the scope of local state 
policy.  Aside from playing a modest informational role, this limits the influence of the state to 
channeling the resources to the supply-side that would allow firms to meet external demand.    
 
Domestic-led growth 
 A defining feature of development in China is that growth is driven by demand in the 
domestic market:  upwards of 85 percent of all manufactured goods produced in China are sold 
domestically, with the percentage even higher for domestic firms.5  Moreover, in sectors 
extending from autos to network equipment to machine tools, China currently represents the 
largest market in the world in terms of both absolute size and growth. The importance of the 
domestic market shifts the terms of development.    
As we argued in Brandt and Thun (2010), demand generated by a large domestic market 
has the potential to facilitate the upgrading process because it eases both the technological and 
marketing gaps that domestic firms face when they export.  Not only do the domestic firms have 
technologies that are better suited to the domestic market, but their understanding of these 
markets is often superior to foreign firms.  
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Central here is the view that the innovation  process within a market segment is shaped 
by two distinct sets of forces that interact in subtle and unpredictable ways:  market forces (e.g. 
relative incomes, demographics, etc.) on the demand side and the technological forces on the 
supply-side (Kline and Rosenberg 1986:  275).  From this perspective, it is not necessarily the 
most sophisticated technology that will most effectively satisfy demand; it depends on what 
product attributes a particular market segment values most highly.  A firm must understand the 
market, develop organizational capabilities that are able to response to this market, and engage in 
the process of combining and re-combining inputs so as to effectively satisfy market demand 
(Christensen 1997; Adner 2002; Govindarajan and Kopalle 2006; Zeng and Williamson 2007).   
Having a diverse set of building blocks on the supply-side allows for more variety and a greater 
number of combinations to be achieved, any one of which might be the solution that perfectly 
satisfies market demand in a given segment at a point in time (Johnson 1992; Fagerberg 2005).     
Each market segment in the domestic market serves as a rung on the developmental 
ladder.  Demand in the low-end—the first rung on the quality ladder—is critical to providing 
domestic firms with “incubation space” in which they can develop capabilities and increase 
volumes.  This market segment must demand product attributes that foreign firms have difficulty 
satisfying (e.g. low-cost) and be large enough to generate returns to finance the upgrading 
process of local firms.  Timing is important—the incubation period must be long enough for 
firms to draw on the resources that are necessary for upgrading—but the length of time is 
difficult to specify ex ante, since it will depend on the richness of existing capabilities on the 
supply-side and the difficulty of the upgrading process.        
Demand in medium and higher-end market segments is equally important.  It enables 
domestic firms to learn about consumers’ preferences in these segments and to justify the sizable 
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investments in R&D, personnel, and equipment that upgrading entails.  The size of these 
segments also attracts the participation of foreign firms—first through imports and subsequently 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) in the local economy—who can play a critical role on 
the supply-side through spillovers to local firms.  These firms typically enter the local market 
through higher-end segments that resemble those in advanced countries, but as they localize 
activities in the “fight for the middle” segments, the foreign firms become conduits of 
managerial and technological knowhow at each step in the quality ladder, i.e. horizontal 
spillovers.  Vertical spillovers are equally, if not more important as foreign OEMs can be 
instrumental in building up the local supply chain, either by encouraging their overseas suppliers 
to locate locally or by working with local suppliers .6  In the upgrading process, this is 
complemented by access through imports to higher quality intermediate goods and capital 
equipment (De Loeker et. al. (2012), which may not be available locally. 
Domestic firms are able to move up the quality ladder only if there are the right set of 
building blocks on both the demand and supply-side.  What previous analysis (e.g. Brandt and 
Thun 2010) neglected is how easily policy-makers, in their eagerness to support development 
efforts, inadvertently restrict the process of combination and recombination that allows firms to 
innovate and meet the demands of the market.  Demand in segments in which domestic firms 
have an advantage may be unintentionally restricted; and the supply of firms, technology, inputs 
and/or skills which are required to meet different aspects of demand may be unintentionally 
excluded.  Policy may also dampen competitive pressures. Unlike in the export-led growth 
model, the state must consider how policies affect the demand-side as carefully as the supply-
side. 
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  Policy Restrictions on the Demand-Side 
On the demand-side, state policy in the form of regulations and market restrictions affect 
knowledge flows about consumer demand and the size of market segments.  Tariffs and non-
tariff barriers raise domestic prices, and limit market size.  In the context of a sector with distinct 
product market segments, an ad valorem tariff will typically skew demand (and domestic 
production) towards the lower end of the market. Tax policy and subsidies may boost demand in 
targeted market segments while reducing that in others. Lower (higher) environmental 
regulations with respect to emissions, for example, can expand (contract) the size of the low 
versus high end of the market.  Concerns about the “race to the bottom” are often predicated on 
lax enforcement of environmental and labor regulations.  Product standards can play a similar 
role.  Finally, government procurement policy can discriminate against firms on the basis of 
ownership or nationality. 
 
Policy Restrictions on the Supply-Side 
On the supply-side, state policy shapes the resources and opportunities that are available 
to firms within the domestic economy, as well as the competitive pressures they face.  In China, 
a key expression of state policy is preferences based on firm ownership:  state vs non-state.  The 
legacy of the planned economy determined where key capabilities initially resided (i.e. in firms 
and research institutes), an influence that endured long after the start of reforms.  In the reform 
era, policies on both the demand and the supply side were often coordinated to give maximum 
support to targeted state firms.  Non-state firms have been systematically discriminated against in 
matters relating to finance (Brandt and Li 2003), access to technology, and M&A activity, and 
have sometimes simply not been allowed to enter a sector (Huang 2008).  State firms, on the 
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other hand, enjoy an equal measure of policy support.  While the overall trend during the reform 
era has been toward a more level playing field between state and non-state firms (Lardy, 2014), 
the pace and extent of market liberalization differs widely between sectors (Brandt et al. 2008).  
This can matter for firms’ upgrading incentives through their ability to attract new resources, e.g. 
skilled personnel, capital, etc. and to sell locally. 
Policy also mediates the flow of global resources into the domestic economy, both by 
affecting the form of technology transfer and entry by multinational firms.  Foreign firms have 
the option of multiple modes of entry (e.g. imports, licensing, and/or FDI) and a primary 
determinant of the mode of entry is the level of control that is required.  Wholly-owned foreign 
enterprises (WOFEs) are more likely to be established for newer products and the most 
sophisticated technologies when concerns about IP are paramount and the desire to increase the 
returns from firm-specific advantage are high, while licensing arrangements will suffice when IP 
concerns are low and products are more mature.  (Hymer 1976; Dunning and Rugman 1985; 
Dunning 1988).7  Each form of technology transfer will influence the “supply” of inputs to the 
domestic economy slightly differently, and at different points in time.  Licensing is likely 
associated with earlier vintage technologies, and thus for products serving the lower end of the 
market.  Although the technology may be “old” from the perspective of the multinational, the fit 
with existing local capabilities of domestic firms may be good, with licensing offering the 
prospect of new knowledge spanning the entire product.  JVs offer the prospect of managerial 
and technical spillovers to the domestic partner, and indirectly through the development of a 
local supply chain.8  WOFEs also offer indirect benefit for domestic firms, however, these 
benefits may only be realized over a longer period of time as a result of the sizable technological 
gap in the market segments these firms initially serve.9  
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Restrictions on modes of entry will be reinforced by tariffs on intermediate goods and 
capital equipment, which increase firm costs on the supply-side.  This impact is likely to be 
larger in higher quality market segments where the role of imported intermediates and capital 
machinery is more important, especially early on, when there are few domestic substitutes.   
Over an extended period of time, tariffs and non-tariff barriers on both final goods and 
intermediates will reduce the size of market segments for higher quality goods, possibly 
discouraging entry by foreign firms into these segments, and minimizing foreign spillovers. 
Higher tariffs also effectively lower the capability threshold that local firms need to achieve to 
sell locally, which can have negative selection effects on market dynamics.   
In short, both sides of the coin are equally important.  An ability to upgrade without the 
incentives to upgrade will thwart the process. Similarly, the incentives to upgrade, i.e. consumers 
willing to pay a premium for higher quality products, but limited channels through which firms 
can obtain the information, knowhow and inputs required to upgrade will do the same thing.  
Constraints on the size and growth of higher end markets can do the same.  A low end by itself 
will also not do the trick. Over time, there needs to be the right combination of competitive 
pressures at the bottom, a growing middle, and channels of upgrading that make it attractive for 
firms to invest in quality upgrading. The different market segments within China’s domestic 
market are each associated with unique information/knowledge flows, and thus opportunities for 
upgrading.  Each value chain represents a rung on the upgrading ladder.     
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
Our analysis uses data from three industrial sectors in China:  automotive, construction 
equipment, and motorcycles.  Industrial yearbooks and industry reports are the primary source of 
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data on market growth and segmentation.  Extensive field research allowed us to identify the key 
upgrading challenges in each sector, assess the extent of capability-building within firms and 
sectors, and the role of policy in shaping these outcomes.    In each sector, interviews were 
conducted at leading firms in the sector and their key suppliers.10   
 
 Case Selection 
Our objective is to understand how the structure of a quality ladder in a sector shapes the 
opportunity for upgrading. As a result, we sought sectors that ex ante appeared to have similar 
opportunities for growth and upgrading, but which had quality ladders that varied in structure as 
a result of differences in government policy.   
The opportunity for upgrading in these three sectors was similar in three respects. First, in 
all three, the length of the quality ladder, which measures the extent of vertical product 
differentiation within a sector and thus the potential for upgrading, was similar. Recent work by 
Khandewal (2010) suggests that globally all three sectors, motorcycles, construction and autos 
have quality ladders of greater than average length, with that for autos the longest, followed by 
construction equipment and then motorcycles.  Moreover, segments along the quality ladder can 
be identified and measured. Second, all three sectors are in a relatively mature stage of 
technological development.  In each, there is a dominant product design, innovation generally 
consists of incremental changes to this design and process improvements, and the value chains 
typically consist of large lead original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and extensive 
outsourcing to suppliers.  Third, each of these sectors was successfully developed by China’s 
neighbors in East Asia, and there was no prima facie reason to believe that China would not have 
similar success.11  
14 
 
While the opportunities for upgrading were similar, variation in state policy led to very 
different outcomes in each sector.  We argued in Section 2 that opportunities in the low, medium 
and high-end segments are critical to fostering upgrading of domestic firms.  Early on, a low end 
is essential, but opportunities in the other two must also be present.  In a rapidly growing 
economy such as China’s with rising incomes, we would expect this to happen as a natural 
matter of course.  In two out of three sectors we examine, however, key market segments were 
often missing or limited in size at critical times as a result of government policy. Key policies on 
the demand and supply-side in each sector are summarized in Figure 1, with those that restricted 
certain segments of the quality ladder—i.e. were not segment neutral— shaded. 
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
In construction equipment, a relatively liberal policy environment with respect to both the 
demand- and the supply-side helped to ensure the required array of market segments and 
opportunities.  Relatively low tariffs on imports of final goods and intermediate inputs helped to 
keep prices low for end-users.  There were also few impediments to foreign participation and 
technology transfer through either licensing, JVs or WOFEs.   Barriers on entry by private firms 
were also relatively low. In short, the policy environment helped to ensure opportunities 
throughout the ladder and access to the knowhow required to serve these market segments. 
In contrast, in autos, there were a variety of regulatory constraints on entry, ownership, 
technology transfer, and tariff and non-tariff barriers.  Tariffs of 80 to100 percent made cars too 
expensive for all but the richest of households.  Entry by private firms was nearly impossible.  
Licensing of technology, often a preferred form for entry to the low end, was limited to a single 
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case, with JVs between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) 
the preferred organizational form.  WOFEs were prohibited.   More generally, competition 
among firms was leisurely up until China’s decision to enter the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  
Motorcycles represent an intermediate case. The level of tariffs that were imposed on 
motorcycle imports was in between those in heavy construction and autos, and barriers to entry 
were much lower than in autos.  However, in the late 1990s, restrictions were imposed on the use 
of motorcycles on highways and in China’s rapidly expanding cities, where incomes were 
higher. With entry into WTO, tariffs on motorcycles also remained high relative to autos.  These 
restrictions had the unintended effect of limiting demand in more demanding market segments. 
A final advantage of these three cases is that reverse causality seems unlikely.  The 
concern here is that rather than state policy shaping the structure of the quality ladder in each 
sector and thus upgrading prospects, a larger low-end in sectors such as construction equipment 
might have obviated the need for state intervention.  Divergence in state policy, however, 
occurred well before there was any substantial difference in the structure of the quality ladders.  
Table 2 shows that tariff rates for construction equipment in 1992 were already much lower than 
the other sectors.  Moreover, Table 1 clearly indicates that all three sectors were in their infancy 
at this time, suggesting that policy-makers had little reason to believe at this point in time that 
indigenous firms would enjoy greater success in wheel-loaders than in low-end cars or 
motorcycles.12  As we will explain in more detail, it was the high initial tariffs on autos—in the 
vicinity of 100 percent—that reduced the size of the low-end of the auto market.  The adverse 
effects of these policies were reinforced by other policies that restricted entry into the sector, and 
the form of technology transfer.13   
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In each case study below, we break the overall sector into segments using familiar 
measures of product quality.   For construction equipment, we use the wheel loader as a proxy 
for the low-end end segment and the excavator for the high-end.  On the demand-side, these two 
products are substitutes for each other, albeit imperfect: the excavator can do more, and do things 
faster.  On the supply-side, for reasons relating to design and manufacturing, especially of the 
hydraulic system, the capabilities and expense required to produce an excavator are significantly 
higher.  Reflecting these differences, the price of an excavator is generally two to three times the 
price of a wheel loader.14  In the case of autos and motorcycles, engine size correlates reasonably 
well with product quality and sophistication in the Chinese market.  For autos, we classify as 
low-end vehicles with displacement of 1.6 litre or less; mid-range is 1.6-2.5, and high-end is 
more than 2.5 litres.  For motorcycles, we divide the market into 100 cc and smaller, 110-125cc, 
and 150 cc and larger.  Figure 2 summarizes the segmentation in each sector and indicates the 
segments that were restricted as a result of state policy.   
 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
  
Variation in Outcomes 
We define movement up the quality ladder as the ability of domestic firms to capture 
market share relative to foreign-invested firms in successively more demanding and higher 
quality products segments within a sector.  Only in one of the three sectors we examine, heavy 
construction equipment, have Chinese firms been able to narrow the gap with multinationals, 
while gaining market share. 
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Table 1 reports for each of the three sectors estimates for select years of several key 
variables: total sales volume by firms producing in China, total domestic market sales, exports 
and imports.15 For heavy construction, sales are for wheel loaders and excavators combined; for 
autos and motorcycles, for sales in all size classes of vehicles.  Growth in the heavy construction 
and auto sectors has been fairly similar, with sales by firms in China growing at impressive 
annual rates in excess of 25 percent.  These sales have largely been directed to the domestic 
market, and exports modest.  With the exception of playing an important role in serving domestic 
demand relatively early on, imports have also been relatively minor.  In contrast, sales growth in 
the motorcycle sector since the mid-1990s has lagged considerably that in the other two sectors -
--they were only a third of that in autos or heavy construction--with exports becoming 
increasingly important.  By 2010, a third of all motorcycles produced in China were exported.   
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
In Figure 3 we report a breakdown of sales in 1999 and 2010 of wheel loaders and heavy 
construction among domestic and foreign firms manufacturing in China.  From the perspective of 
the 1990s, there is clear segmentation in the market:  Chinese firms dominate the low-end wheel 
loader segment, while foreign firms capture much of the market for higher-end excavators 
through local production and imports. In volume terms, the market for wheel loaders is also 
larger.  Over time, there are two clear indications of successful upgrading on the part of Chinese 
firms.  First, leading firms in wheel-loaders were able to gain market share, and between 1997 
and 2010 the four-form concentration ratio increased from 43.5% to 62.2%.  They also moved 
into larger machines that they were able to sell at a premium.16 Second, they succeeded in 
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penetrating the demanding market for excavators, and over the same period increased their 
market share from only 10.8% to 27.4%.  By 2011, the market share of domestic firms in the 
excavator segment was in upwards of 50% (CLSA 2013:  9).  Over the same period, foreign 
firms made inroads into the highly competitive wheel loader market.  
 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
 
 Although Chinese excavators typically sold at a 10-30% price discount to foreign 
competitors (and often were able to arrange more favourable financing terms), the quality of 
machines was comparable to the foreign products.  In 2013, the investment advisory CLSA, 
commissioned a comparative test of the 13 leading excavator brands in China, and measured the 
machines according to productivity, fuel economy, and durability over 185 working hours during 
a two week period.  In the medium class segment (20 to 24.9 tons), which is the largest segment 
in the Chinese market, Caterpillar was the leader in work-cycle, productivity and durability, and 
was followed by Sany, a Chinese firm in each case.  Sany was the leader in fuel-efficiency 
(CLSA 2013:  33).  Overall, the study found that “technology gaps are non-existent between top-
tier Chinese and international companies because both source critical components, such as 
engines and hydraulic systems, directly from global suppliers” (CLSA 2013:  23). 
The automotive sector has also enjoyed rapid growth, with sales of cars in China rising 
more than twenty fold from 0.52 million units in 1997 to 11.6 million in 2010. Most of the 
increase in demand has been met by rapid expansion of output of OEMs manufacturing in China, 
with imports remaining relatively unimportant except at the very high end of the market.  Much 
is often made of the near doubling of the market share in volume terms of Chinese OEMs to 
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more than thirty percent, but this is misleading in several respects.  First, their share of the 
market in value terms is only half that in volume terms (Warburton et al. 2013), implying that 
they are heavily concentrated in the low end.  Second, this increase has been largely achieved 
through an increase in the number of Chinese OEMs, and a proliferation of models among them 
rather than sales per model: In 2010, median sales per model by a Chinese SOE (private) OEM 
were one-sixth (one-third) of a foreign OEM (author's calculations based on CATARC 2011).   
In general, Chinese automotive firms have shown limited ability to leverage this growth 
into movement up the quality ladder.  A recent report by a third-party investment analyst is 
informative: “The leading Chinese products now have bodies, safety and suspension hardware 
that are largely competitive. But they are behind on engine technology and are also let down by 
assembly standards, material choices, systems integration, refinement, and a lack of final 
development and testing. They are still a long way from being genuinely ‘world class.’ 
(Warburton et al. 2013:  1)”17     
In the motorcycle sector, domestic firms have long dominated the local market, but 
upgrading in the sector has been modest, and Chinese firms have shown limited success in 
moving into higher-end segments of the market.  Production remains focused on the low-end, 
and sales of the standard low-end product, the 125 cc motorcycle, increased from 23.6% of total 
volume in 2003 to 57.5% in 2010.  Fragmentation in the industry has also increased, with the 
four-firm concentration ratio decreasing from 40.3% in 1997 to 30.0% in 2010.   
After 1997, the focus of domestic motorcycle firms shifted to export markets, with nearly 
two-thirds of subsequent growth in sales by domestic firms tied to exports, but this shift did little 
to increase the ability of domestic firms to move into higher-end segments.18  Chinese firms 
sought export markets that demanded products at the same or lower level on the quality ladder as 
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the Chinese market.  Aided by VAT rebates, and other export subsidies, exports were primarily 
to lower-income countries in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America, where competition was 
based primarily on price and not quality.  Within these markets, growth was most robust for low-
end products, notably 100 cc and especially 110 cc motorcycles, with this segment representing 
more than half of the growth in exports between 2004 and 2010 in absolute terms.  Indicative of 
low and falling average export quality, the price of exports during this period declines 
markedly.19  By 2010, exports of Chinese firms were also beginning to lose out in markets such 
as Vietnam to local JVs.    
In the case studies that follow, we seek to explain first, how policy shaped the growth and 
segmentation of these markets; and second, how this segmentation influenced upgrading and 
innovation in the sectors.   
 
4.  Construction Equipment 
 The ability of Chinese construction equipment firms to produce and capture market share 
in successively more demanding product segments was the result of highly complementary 
factors on the supply- and demand-side, both of which were shaped by state policy.  We discuss 
each of them separately, and then briefly their interaction and complementary role. 
 
 The Supply-Side 
The early development of China’s construction equipment industry owes much to 
decisions that were made under state planning.  The Ministry of Machinery Industry (MMI) in 
Beijing directed the flow of technology, personnel, and other resources between key firms and 
research institutes.  Liugong, the leading producer of wheel loaders in 2012, for instance, was 
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originally set up in 1958 by MMI in the interior province of Guangxi.20   In the mid-1980s, as 
part of efforts to modernize the heavy construction sector, MMI arranged the licensing of 
technology from major foreign firms such as Caterpillar and Komatsu for a line of key products 
and components and distributed the technology to leading SOEs, including Liugong.    
Critical here was the decision by MMI to license an older (vintage late 1960s/early 1970s) 
wheel loader technology, which was a reasonably good fit with the existing capabilities of the 
SOEs and their suppliers, and as explained more fully below, market demand in China. Through 
licensing, Chinese firms were able to learn and acquire mastery of all aspects of the new 
technology from the inside out.  Initially, some of the key intermediates were imported from 
leading Western firms, but over time, 100 percent local sourcing was achieved. Policy with 
respect to the wheel loader was complemented by the establishment of several JVs and WOS that 
focused on the excavator.  The technical requirements for the excavator were higher on multiple 
levels (design, assembly, key intermediates), which made licensing of even older excavator 
technology directly to Chinese domestics less feasible at this time.  Larger wheel loaders and 
excavators were imported. 
 Yasheng Huang (2008) argues persuasively that in the 1990s, private firms in China often 
found it very difficult to obtain the licenses required to enter newly emerging sectors.  In the 
heavy construction sector, however, private firms began to enter in growing numbers, with the 
supply network an important channel of technology transfer to these firms.  In Fujian, for 
example, several local suppliers to a leading SOE that was among the original licensees of CAT 
wheel loader technology moved downstream into the wheel loader market.  Private firm entry 
was further facilitated by relatively low technical barriers to entry for the low-end wheel loader 
market, limited IP protection, accumulating human capital in the sector in both SOEs and 
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foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), and an expanding local supply chain.  The relatively low 
technical barriers to entry and the set of existing capabilities in the wheel loader sector were both 
heavily influenced by the earlier technology licensing decision.   
The state’s relatively agnostic view regarding state versus private ownership among domestic 
firms is reflected in the changing composition of leading wheel loader firms between 1998 and 
2010.  Both state and private firms have succeeded (and failed) in a highly competitive 
environment.  Two of the top four firms (Liugong and Xiagong) in 2010 were restructured state 
firms that were also leading firms in 1998; one was a private firm (Longgong) and a new entrant, 
and the other was a former state firm (Lingong) that Volvo acquired a majority share (70%) of in 
2006.  A number of early market leaders were no longer contenders, either because they could 
not keep up or because they decided to move into less competitive product markets 
State policy towards foreign entry was also relatively liberal.  Foreign firms found it very 
difficult to compete in the highly cost-sensitive low-end segments of the market, but their 
technical capabilities gave them an advantage at the high-end of the quality ladder.  In these 
market segments, the foreign firms had a choice of entry strategies, and choices were determined 
by the relative need to control technology and manufacturing processes, and market size in China.  
Machines that were premium global products and demanded in relatively small numbers in 
China were imported (e.g. large scale mining equipment).  Excavators and high-end wheel 
loaders were produced in WOFEs or JVs that were majority controlled by the foreign partner and 
initially used a higher percentage of imported components (particularly for core parts such as 
hydraulics and engines).  Low tariffs on imported intermediates helped to keep costs down.  As 
these parts were localized, sourcing was from foreign-invested suppliers.   In order to expand 
market access in lower-end segment, foreign firms began to experiment with a range of entry 
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strategies, including local M&A.  Caterpillar and Volvo, for example, acquired Chinese firms 
and then sought to improve the quality of the basic wheel loaders that these firms produced.  In 
both cases, this meant pushing their supplier development programs far deeper into the supply 
chain then was the case for their wholly-owned facilities.   
Diversity in the mode of foreign entry (e.g. WOFEs, JVs, technology licensing, and 
imports) was important because each brought different advantages and know-how to the 
upgrading process on the supply-side.  Imports helped to identify new market opportunities for 
local firms.  Licensing transferred technologies that were outdated in advanced markets, but 
provided Chinese firms with broad product knowledge, including systems integration, and 
opportunities for learning-by-doing (and a foundation for incremental improvement).21  Foreign-
owned facilities had more advanced technologies, but competitive pressures to “fight for the 
middle” segments of the Chinese market forced them to aggressively localize their operations, 
which offered a new range of upgrading opportunities for Chinese supply firms.    
This diversity combined with liberal policy with respect to entry, bankruptcy and exit 
helped to ensure that the capabilities that were being developed within the sector flowed to those 
firms that would utilize them most effectively.  Sany’s highly successful foray into the excavator, 
for example, drew heavily on the R&D personnel from a failed excavator JV.  The two leading 
manufacturers of cement pumps in China grew out of state-supported research institute in 
Changsha, Hunan. 
The critical point here is not that any single ownership form or foreign entry mode was a 
priori better than the next.  They often facilitated serving different market segments. Each 
however contributed different elements to the ecosystem of the sector, which intense competition 
forced firms to re-combine in new and novel ways on the supply-side.   
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The Demand-Side     
China’s heavy construction sector has been a huge beneficiary of rapid growth in demand 
that has been largely domestic in nature.  Exports have played only a minor role in the sector’s 
expansion.   The unusual feature of demand in this sector, relative to motorcycles and 
automobiles, is two-fold: first, from the outset, demand spanned all market segments from low to 
high; and second, over time, all market segments have enjoyed robust growth, with a shift to 
higher end segments. More generally, the level of local demand in the heavy construction sector 
has been supported by very low tariffs compared to those imposed in autos or motorcycles (see 
Table 2). 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
In the initial stage of growth there was a large low-end segment that allowed domestic 
firms to “incubate” capabilities. During the 1990s, domestic demand in China for wheel-loaders 
outstripped that for excavators, often by a 2 to 1 margin.  This ratio, which was the reverse of 
that found in developed markets, reflected several features of local demand. At China’s level of 
per capita GDP throughout much of this period, the higher price of the excavator (and difficulties 
in accessing finance) put it out of limits for many customers.  In addition, with low labor costs, 
the higher productivity of the excavator was less important.22  The demand for the wheel loader 
was dominated by individual contractors and small-to-medium non-state firms in the 
construction industry, who demanded a very high price-performance ratio. 23 By contrast, the 
high end of the wheel loader market, machines used in ports and coal mines, was often by state-
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owned firms.  Similarly, much of the demand for excavators was coming from larger state-
owned construction companies. The demands of these users were more similar to those found in 
global markets.    
The higher end segments, while always present, expanded rapidly over the course of 
development.  Up through 2005, domestic sales of the two products grew in tandem, at an annual 
rate of 30%, but after 2005 growth in demand of excavators was double that of wheel loaders (30% 
vs. 15%).  By 2010, domestic sales of the excavator (by unit) surpassed that of the wheel loader.  
Given the price differences, excavator sales by value were 2.5-3 times that of wheel loader sales.  
This growth provided strong incentives for domestic firms to develop the capabilities required to 
shift into higher-end segments.    
 
The Interactions 
Growth (or expectations of growth) throughout all market segments was extremely 
important to the positive dynamics on the supply-side we observe, as were policies that did not 
overtly discriminate against multinationals or private firms, or particular market segments.  At 
the outset, this encouraged multinationals to enter and invest in developing capabilities in China 
in expectation of serving a rapidly expanding local market.  Similar expectations fueled 
investments by Chinese firms in deepening capabilities that would enable them both to capture 
more of the lower end wheel loader market, but also to move into larger wheel loaders, and the 
excavator.    
Thus, even in the face of intense competition and falling prices for both wheel loaders 
and excavators, we do not observe a race to the bottom. Rather upgrading and market 
consolidation dominate these sectors as “better” firms win out.  Firms had both the incentives 
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and access to the knowhow required to upgrade to escape the low-end competition, and a 
growing pool of domestic customers willing to pay premiums. Distribution and marketing 
channels that these same firms were heavily investing in were also providing the information on 
those product features customers were most willing to pay for.    
 
5.  Motorcycles 
 
The Supply-Side 
The motorcycle sector has early parallels with the construction equipment sector.  In the 
early 1980s, there was a series of technology licensing agreements between leading Japanese 
firms (e.g. Suzuki, Honda, Yamaha) and upwards of 20 state-owned firms, most of which were 
defense-related, to license technology for 100 cc motorcycles.  These firms possessed engineers, 
skilled technicians, and machining know-how, and the technology transfer agreements were part 
of efforts to convert these firms from military to civilian production. Initially, SOEs dominated 
the market, but subsequently, entry barriers were lowered and high levels of entry by both 
foreign and Chinese private firms spawned a large low-end segment that was dominated by 
domestic firms. 
Many of the Japanese firms that had originally licensed technology to China in the 1980s 
formed JVs, hoping to capitalize on their higher level of quality and capture high-end urban 
demand (Ohara 2006:  127).  Private firms also began to enter in mass, copying the designs of 
models produced by state firms and sourcing components from their suppliers. They also hired 
their managers, engineers and workers.   Between 1991 and 1997, the number of firms in the 
sector increased from 59 to 143 (Automotive Industry of China, 2002), production grew eight 
fold from 1.2 million units to 9.6 million.  In 1997, production was still dominated by state firms, 
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who held two-thirds of the market, but there were also private and collective firms (21.5%) and 
FIEs (12.7%).24  Market concentration was relatively low, with the top 4 firms having 40% of the 
market.    
The domestic market during this period provided an ideal environment for incremental 
innovation focused on the low-end segment.  As Ohara explains, the “base model” for products 
was derived from the product designs of Japanese firms, but these products were designed for 
consumers in advanced markets that valued high-performance (Ohara 2006:  44).  Given the 
intense competition with the Chinese market, domestic firms made incremental changes that 
allowed them to alter the cost/quality ratio (e.g. using cheaper raw materials, using steel-stamped 
parts rather than forged parts, using different processes for quality control etc., see Ohara 2006:  
58 and 60).  The market soon coalesced around several base models as new entrants used 
common suppliers (which lowered cost) and consumers demanded inter-changeable parts (which 
lowered the cost of repairs).  Domestic sales between 1991 and 1997 grew at an annual rate of 
39.6%, with most of this growth in the very low-end segments of 100 cc and smaller (see Table 
1).  In 1997, 95.3% of domestic sales were for motorcycles 125 cc or below (see Table 3). 
 
[Table 3 about here.] 
 
The Demand-Side 
The key difference in motorcycles has been the manner in which restrictions on domestic 
demand have weakened growth in all segments above the low-end. Through the 1980s, and 
under a very high tariff umbrella, production in the sector initially grew only modestly, with an 
annual growth rate of only 4.1% between 1985 and 1991.25   Demand-side constraints were 
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relaxed in the 1990s, aided by the reduction in tariffs on motorcycles of nearly a half to slightly 
more than 50 percent. As illustrated by Table 1, production expanded rapidly up between 1991 
and 1997.  Subsequently, however, new restrictions on the use of motorcycles in China’s 150 
largest cities sharply reduced demand from the market segment that was growing most rapidly 
and had the highest per capita incomes.  Tariffs on motorcycles also remained high in China after 
accession to the WTO, while tariffs on automobiles were reduced (see Table 2).  Tariffs affected 
the demand in all market segments for motorcycles, but the impact may have been most severe in 
the higher end that competed with cars for customers.26 A comparison between China and 
Taiwan with respect to the percentage of households that owned motorcycles is informative. By 
1991, 79.2% of all households in Taiwan owned motorcycles. By comparison, in 2000 only 21.9 
(18.8) percent of rural (urban) households did so.  This percentage rose to 62.2 percent in the 
countryside by 2012, but in the cities rose only marginally to 20.3 percent.27  
More recently, demanding environmental requirements have been issued, which has 
increased the costs of motorcycles, and in some cases may be exceeding firm capabilities.  As a 
result of these policies, growth in domestic demand for motorcycles slowed to less than five 
percent per annum between 1997 and 2010, and growth in higher-end segments was severely 
restricted.28   
 
The Interactions 
The lack of demand for higher quality bikes weakened the incentives of both foreign and 
domestic firms to invest in the channels of capability building that would allow them to move 
along the quality ladder.  The natural target markets for foreign firms were urban areas, where 
higher-income consumers typically placed a higher premium on quality than their rural 
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counterparts.  Rural consumers tend to purchase standard products, and valued ease of repair and 
low price rather than high-quality (Interview 040812a; Ohara 2006:  33). With the disappearance 
of urban markets, foreign firms had limited incentive to deepen investment in the local 
manufacturing facilities required to serve higher-end segments, and the leading Japanese firms 
actually shifted strategies and began to focus on the low-end market.29   
Honda, for instance, after watching its market share for bikes produced through its 
wholly-owned subsidiary decrease from 24% in 1995 to 3% in 2000, formed a series of JVs with 
Chinese “imitators,” and began to adapt a Chinese approach to production.  Xindazhou Honda 
was established in 2001, and the 125 cc model was priced at RMB 5,500.  This was half the price 
of a comparable Honda model, but still almost twice the price of a comparable domestic model 
(Abo 2011:  42-43).  At a second JV, Wuyang Honda, the sales price for the 125 cc model was 
reduced to RMB 4,729 in 2004, which helped to halt a sharp decline in the JVs sales volumes 
(Abo 2011:  43).   As in the case of the foreign firms that acquired stakes in Chinese wheel 
loader firms, the Japanese focused on production processes within these JVs led to improvements 
in product quality, but unlike in construction equipment, the Japanese were not nurturing 
capabilities at every step of the quality ladder.  The Japanese were abandoning the high-end and 
re-enforcing the skill set of Chinese firms at the low-end. 
Domestic firms similarly had little incentive to invest in the capability building that 
would allow them to compete in high-end segments given the lack of demand in these segments.  
To give an example, one leading Chinese firm designed a 600 cc motorcycle with an Italian 
partner (which it later acquired) for sale in the Chinese market.  The model sold for RMB 39,000 
compared to RMB 80,000 for a comparable European, but sales were disappointing.  As one 
manager explained, investments in high-end products rarely could be justified in economic terms 
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(040812b).  Even when firms did seek to upgrade, they had fewer resources to draw on.  The 
lack of foreign involvement in the high-end meant the channels of upgrading were absent; the 
inability to increase profit margins by differentiating a low-end product reduced the ability of 
Chinese firm to finance these kinds of investments.30  All firms—Chinese and FIEs alike—were 
competing in a segment in which consumers demanded largely undifferentiated products and in 
which barriers to entry were low. 
Why did export markets not allow Chinese firms to move up the quality ladder?  The 
shift to export markets after 1997 appears to mimic the developmental trajectory of Japan’s 
motorcycle industry, but there are critical differences.  Most importantly, the Japanese firms 
began to export after leading firms began to improve quality.  As Ohara notes, there were more 
than 100 motorcycle manufacturers competing in the Japanese domestic market in the 1950s, a 
level of fragmentation similar to China in the 1990s, but this number fell to 7 (and then 4) as 
growth began to slow in the 1960s.  The firms that survived the domestic shake-out were able to 
compete higher on the quality ladder, as was demanded by foreign consumers, and by the 1980s, 
70% of sales were overseas.  
 In contrast to Japan, the Chinese motorcycle firms began exporting before capabilities 
had seriously deepened and any consolidation occurred within the domestic industry. This lack 
of consolidation may have been partially attributable to local politics, and in particular local 
governments that had both the incentive and the means to support local firms, but it was also a 
result of the homogenous nature of domestic demand in China: without higher-end segments, the 
more ambitious and capable firms had limited means or incentives to differentiate themselves.  
With only low-end products, when firms went abroad, they had no choice but to concentrate on 
markets that mirrored the demand characteristics of China.   Export subsidies in the form of VAT 
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rebates to these manufacturers and favorable payment terms for buyers only reinforced this 
behavior. 
Export markets, of course, will have the higher-end demand segments that are missing in 
China’s domestic market, and this could provide the incentive for upgrading.  Stitching together 
a quality ladder, with the low-end in the domestic market and the high-end abroad is not the 
same as having all segments at home, however.  The former offers the incentive for domestic 
firms to upgrade, but because the high-end segments are not within China, there is no 
competition effect pushing foreign firms to localize and expand channels of capability building 
within the Chinese economy.   
 
6.  Autos 
Although the auto industry was roughly similar to construction equipment and 
motorcycles at the start of the reform period—the industry was small and fragmented, largely 
state-owned, and technology was badly dated—the central government had far greater ambitions 
than in the other sectors, as evidenced by the publication of three official industrial policy 
statements (1994, 2004, 2009) for the sector within a fifteen year period (Anderson 2012).  
It is necessary to distinguish between two stages of growth in the auto sector, with 
China’s entry to the WTO as the rough point of demarcation.    
 
Pre-WTO  
During the first two decades of the reform-era, the state tightly regulated both the supply- 
and the demand-side of auto sector development.  
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On the supply-side, the state directly chose the firms that were able to participate in the 
sector.  The central government designated six domestic firms (“three big and three small”), all 
of which were state firms, as the key firms in the industry, and declared that no others would be 
given licenses to enter the sector.31 The number of centrally-approved firms grew slightly 
throughout the 1990s, but the sector remained largely closed to non-state firms, and the three 
“big” firms—First Auto Works (FAW), Shanghai Auto, and Dongfeng—continued to have a 67% 
share of the sedan market through their subsidiaries as late as 2002 (Thun 2006:  61).  The state 
also tightly regulated the form of foreign entry and technology transfer:  foreign firms were 
forbidden from owning more than 50% of an assembly operation, and each was partnered with a 
key state-owned firm in a joint venture.32  Tianjin Auto, a municipally-owned SOE, was the one 
firm without a JV partner during this period, and it licensed technology for a small passenger car 
from Daihatsu.  High tariff barriers protected these ventures from external competition as part of 
a more general policy of “trading technology for market.” The tariff on vehicles with engines 3.0 
liters and larger was 100 percent and 80 percent on those smaller. 
The JVs as an ownership form had their advantages with respect to technology transfer.  
The products were sold under the brand of the foreign partner, so the foreign firm took care to 
control the manufacturing operations of the JV, and gradually improve the capabilities of the 
supply chain (Thun 2006).  The JV structure allowed for a greater transfer of the tacit knowledge 
than would have been possible in licensing deals and this played a crucial role in improving the 
operational skills of the domestic partners.33  But in the context of a JV with state-owned 
partners who were likely future competitors, foreign firms were less inclined to transfer the 
technologies and knowhow that were considered to be core capabilities, particularly those 
involving vehicle design (Nam and Li 2012).  The foreign firms conducted the design and 
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development of vehicles outside of China, and until competitive pressures and an expanded 
domestic market provided incentives to shift R&D to China, they sought to use the JVs as 
contract manufacturing firms.  The lack of wholly-owned foreign firms contributed to the lack of 
technology depth in the sector of the sort that WOFE foreign excavator firms willingly brought; 
the lack of technology licensing agreements at the vehicle level and independent domestic firms 
meant that local firms were not acquiring the systems-wide knowledge of the sort Chinese wheel 
loader manufacturers were acquiring, nor were there firms capable of supplying the low-end.   
On the demand-side, the same combination of high barriers to entry and high levels of 
protectionism increased prices and skewed the market away from the low-end segment. This is 
captured in the top two panels of Figure 4 which show average vehicle prices for car models by 
engine size for 1995 and 2001.  The size of the “bubble” for each model in the middle panel 
captures model sales (larger bubble, larger sales.) The average price of a vehicle in the mid-
1990s, for example, was RMB 130,000, or forty time per capita incomes, and that for the Tianjin 
Xiali at least half of this.  By comparison, the price of a standard vehicle in the initial stages of 
motorization in early developers (United States in the 1920s, Germany in the 1950s, and Japan in 
the 1960s) was roughly equal to annual average per capita income (Li 2009:  9).   Private 
demand for autos in China languished, and the market was dominated by less price-sensitive 
government units, state-owned firms, and taxi companies.34  As late as 2000, sales of vehicles 1.6 
liter or less were only 200,000, the majority of these were from a single firm—Tianjin Xiali (see 
Table 4).  Sales of vehicles a litre or less were only 80,000. 
 
[Figure 4 about here.] 
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During this early stage of development there was very little movement along the quality 
ladder in the auto sector.  While the state had considerable bargaining power in negotiations over 
the parameters of technology transfer (e.g. vintage of technology, content to be transferred, 
localization rates, etc.), these policies were crude instruments that were easily eluded by firms 
when not in their interests.  The firms that the state allowed into the sector were highly profitable 
due to high levels of protectionism and limited competition in the sector. With the size and 
growth in demand at other points along the quality ladder limited, there was little incentive for 
these firms to make additional investments in the market.    
 
Post-WTO Accession 
At the end of the 1990s, when it was clear that China would soon be joining the WTO, 
the balance between state and market within the sector shifted.   
On the supply-side, the state became more permissive over entry into the sector.  The 
government began issuing licenses for new OEM JVs, and allowed more foreign firms into the 
market (although WOFE OEMs were still forbidden).35  At the same time, independent Chinese 
firms—both state and non-state—were allowed to enter the sector, and diversity on the supply-
side began to increase.  These new entrants continued to face obstacles obtaining production 
licenses and financing, but these gradually lessened over time and product variety offered on the 
market increased dramatically.  Between 1995 and 2009, for example, the number of models 
increased from less than 30 in 1995 to 396 in 2009 (Li et al. 2014:  7).   
On the demand-side, dramatic tariff reductions—from as high as 100% fell to 25% for 
vehicles and 10% for components—led to lower prices and dramatic growth in the private car 
market. The share of individual purchases increased from under 20% in 1996 to over 60% in 
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2006.  Between 2000 and 2010, the low-end share of the market increased from 47.7% to 58.9% 
and in absolute terms expanded by 3.5 million units (see Table 4).   
During the decade that followed China’s accession to the WTO, liberalization on the 
supply- and demand-side of the Chinese auto industry interacted in a pattern that almost exactly 
followed the dynamic of construction equipment.  First, high rates of entry increased competition 
and led to lower prices.  Between 2000 and 2005, prices of existing models fell closely in line 
with the reduction in tariff (Brandt and Von Biesebroeck 2006).  After this period, reduction in 
input tariffs and increased market competition and falling mark-ups contributed to a further 
reduction in auto prices (Li et al. 2014).  Second, as Figure 4 illustrates, declining prices during 
this period led to a rapid expansion of all segments of the quality ladder, and particularly the 
highly price sensitive the low-end.  In 1995, 290,717 cars with an engine size less than 1.6 liters 
were sold in China; in 2010, there were sales of 6,645,875 cars in this segment.  Third, rapid 
expansion of the low-end further induced foreign-invested firms to localize activities in order to 
lower cost (and thereby pushed capabilities into the domestic economy).  Finally, intense 
competition in the low-end provided domestic firms incentives for developing the capabilities 
necessary to move into higher-end segments.   
Although the dynamic is very similar to construction equipment, as we explained in 
Section 3, the result has not been the same:  production volumes of Chinese auto firms have 
grown, but this has been largely through model proliferation, with these same firms showing 
little capacity for moving into more demanding segments of the quality ladder.  The most critical 
issue is that auto firms missed the almost two decade incubation period enjoyed by Chinese 
wheel-loader firms, a time when they were able to incrementally improve their capabilities 
relatively free from foreign competition in the lower end.   As major beneficiaries of high profits 
36 
 
in the JVs, the dominant state firms had little incentive to push aggressively to develop 
independent capabilities.  The independent auto OEMs that entered the low-end segment after 
accession to the WTO were new (often private) firms, which did not have the benefit of a strong 
foundation of capabilities developed during the initial stage of growth.36  As a result, they either 
copied designs or outsourced design work to foreign firms in order to catch the wave of rapidly 
rising demand.37  The outsourcing of design work, combined with less R&D activity in general 
resulted in R&D costs per unit that were far below the global norm (Warburton et al. 2013).38  
The consequence of this approach was a relatively shallow depth of design knowledge and less 
ability to engage in the types of incremental innovation that would enable them to move up the 
quality ladder and compete with foreign firms.39  Within a decade of China’s accession to the 
WTO, foreign-invested firms were aggressively entering the low-end of the Chinese market and 
the window of opportunity for domestic firms had slammed shut.     
In contrast to the OEMs, Chinese auto component firms have been able to upgrade their 
technical capabilities and are among leading exporters in the sector.  Policy in the component 
sector was far less restrictive than in the assembly sector.  On the supply-side, there was a 
diversity of ownership forms:  foreign firms were allowed to establish wholly-owned enterprises, 
as well as JVs, and private sector firms were allowed to enter.  Initially, the supply chains were 
dominated by state firms, but competitive pressures gradually led to more diversification.  
Moreover, unlike some of the SOE Chinese partners in the OEM JVs, many of these suppliers 
had independent ambitions (and because entry was not restricted, they had a competitive push to 
achieve these ambitions).  On the demand-side, there was a fuller complement of market 
segments.  At the low-end, component firms could export into the global aftermarket.  They 
could also supply the commercial truck industry, which was dominated by independent domestic 
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firms, mainly SOEs.  The older products that were being introduced at the JV OEMs were 
exactly the stepping stone that the local supply firms required in order to gradually upgrade their 
manufacturing capabilities. Local content requirements may have aided these efforts.   
 
7.  Extending the Argument 
We have only looked at three sectors in this paper, but there is good reason to believe that 
the argument has wider applicability.  Our expectation is that upgrading will be most pronounced 
in those sectors in which state policy has not been overly restrictive on the supply-side (i.e. 
through ownership restrictions or regulations on forms and types technology transfer) and in 
which there has been robust growth in all segments of the quality ladder, albeit not necessarily 
equal growth at the same time.  This would include sectors as diverse as machine tools, white 
goods, elevators, power tools, and biological enzymes.  
Telecom equipment, a sector in which China has had great success in developing globally 
competitive firms, is like construction equipment in that wide diversity on the supply-side was 
accompanied by multiple demand segments along the quality ladder.40  On the supply-side, 
despite being viewed as a strategic sector, the state allowed entry of a diverse set of firms much 
earlier than in the auto sector.  In the 1980s, as part of a policy of “trading market for technology” 
the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) negotiated JVs between SOEs and leading 
international telecom companies for digital switches.41  Several competing state initiatives 
emerged to “localize” the same technology, the most successful of which was then licensed to a 
half dozen different firms under MPT.  The technology (along with personnel) soon diffused to 
firms with weaker ties to the state, such as ZTE and Huawei.  Unlike in the automotive sector, 
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the competition within the sector was intense, and drove firms to upgrade their products and 
lower their costs.42 
On the demand side, the rapid development of the Chinese telecommunications 
infrastructure provided strong growth opportunities in multiple market segments.  First-tier cities 
such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou originally utilized imports to build their network, and 
were the obvious targets of the JVs.  The lower tier cities were more challenging for JVs because 
product requirements and cost considerations were very different.43  Aware of the shortcomings, 
and aided by highly decentralized procurement decisions under MPT, firms such as Huawei 
tailored their products to meet these requirements (Brandt and Thun 2011).  Success in these 
markets provided firms with the revenue needed to fuel growth and an opportunity to learn-by-
doing.  “We started in the rural market, which was more sensitive to cost and less sensitive to 
quality,” explained a Huawei engineer, and “we moved from the village to the county to the 
prefecture to the capital cities of provinces (Interview 072312).”  In these efforts, they were 
aided by the ongoing localization efforts of the JVs, and the increased availability of key 
intermediates and personnel. When operators in first tier cities continued to discriminate against 
their new 2G (Second Generation) products, they shifted into global markets, and only later 
returned to take advantage of the rapid growth in the domestic market.   
Wind turbines provide a contrasting example. In the early 2000s, the domestic industry 
was dominated by the multinationals, largely through JVs. There were a relatively small number 
of domestic firms, of which Goldwind was the largest, which entered the sector through 
technology licensing agreements with some of the smaller European manufacturers and design 
firms. Within five years, and almost exclusively in the context of the rapid growth in the 
domestic market promoted by government policy, domestic firms came to dominate, and today 
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have in the vicinity of 95% of the domestic market. JVs have largely disappeared and MNCs 
supply the local market largely through a small number of wholly-owned subsidiaries.   
On the surface, this looks like a case of success, and there is an extensive literature 
documenting the rise of Chinese domestic firms, and the role of public policy in supporting the 
development of the domestic sector (Lewis 2012; Nahm and Steinfeld 2014).  But there may be 
less than meets the eye.  The sharp drop in the market share of the MNCs may have as much to 
do with government procurement policy that discriminated against them, as well as localization 
requirements that made it harder for them to compete (Brandt and Abrami 2014).  The industry is 
increasingly dominated by a handful of firms, largely SOEs.  Moreover, a majority of the 
expansion in wind farms, the customers for wind turbines, has been by subsidiaries of the five 
big power generating companies, two of which also have acquired domestic wind turbine 
manufacturers.  In both cases, a high percentage of the turbines procured by the wind farms were 
from the wind turbine subsidiary acquired by the parent group. Vertical integration and the 
dominance of state firms throughout the value chain has dampened the demand for more efficient 
wind turbines relative to a sector in which independent power producers facing harder budget 
constraints were allowed a larger role.  Recently, it has been reported that less efficient wind 
farms with higher costs were receiving higher feed-in-tariffs.    
The end result is that Chinese wind turbine firms have been able to increase the size of 
the wind turbines that they manufacture, but they are not able to compete globally, even in wind 
turbines between 1.5 and 2 MW that are the “bread and butter” of the sector. Moreover, like their 
domestic counterparts in the auto sector, they are generally weak in design capabilities and 
highly dependent on foreign firms for their control systems, two key capabilities critical for long 
term success.44 
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8. Conclusion 
In this paper we argue that each segment of a quality ladder plays a critical role in the 
ability of domestic Chinese firms to compete successfully with firms from advanced countries in 
increasingly demanding market segments.  When state policy restricts demand in one of these 
segments or limits the availability of inputs that are needed to meet this demand, the (often 
inadvertent) result is to knock a rung out of the developmental ladder.  The low-end provides 
domestic firms with an “incubation space” that is relatively free from foreign competition; the 
higher-end segments offers incentives for foreign firms to localize activities and domestic firm to 
upgrade.  The result of this process is an intense interaction between foreign and domestic firms 
that nurtures new capabilities and fosters innovation within the domestic economy. 
This is not an argument for every country and every sector.  For countries with small 
domestic markets, the incubation space in the low-end will not be large enough for domestic 
firms to gain scale; similarly, the higher-end segments will be too small to encourage foreign 
firms to localize their activities.  Thus, a policy approach that works in China will not work in 
Cambodia (although regional cooperation may allow smaller states to enjoy similar advantages).  
Furthermore, demand characteristics in the domestic market must be significantly different than 
in developed markets, a characteristic that we have captured in the length of the quality ladder, 
so as to provide “natural” protection from foreign firms.  When quality ladders are relatively 
short (e.g. commercial aircraft, nuclear reactors), there is much less room at the bottom for 
domestic firms.  These caveats aside, there are over a dozen countries that have domestic 
markets of a scale that allow for dynamics similar to what we describe in China, and which now 
play an increasingly important role in the global economy (Sinkovics et al. 2014).45  
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For states that are fortunate to have a large domestic market, the policy objective should 
be to maximize this natural advantage:  Policy should seek to support the growth of the market in 
a way that is segment neutral and allow multiple forms of entry and technology transfer to better 
enable firms to innovate to meet demand in this market.  Competition between foreign and 
domestic firms should not be viewed as zero-sum, with gains for one coming at the expense of 
the other.  Initially, each set of firms has market segments in which they have a competitive 
advantage.  
Policies that dampen the “fight for the middle” dynamics should be avoided.  High tariffs 
may eliminate the natural advantage of domestic firms if they serve to restrict the overall size of 
the market and decrease the size of the low-end (as was the case in autos).  Similarly, entry 
restrictions on foreign firms will inhibit these firms from localizing and building supply chains in 
the high end that over a slightly longer period can serve domestic firms.  At the same time, 
policies that favor the low-end segment (e.g. lax regulation of environmental or labor laws, tax 
policies that support exports at the expense of selling to the domestic market) enable firms at the 
low-end of the quality ladder to remain profitable and discourage upgrading.       
Our argument should not be taken to imply that all policy interventions will have an 
adverse effect on development. Indeed, there is a very wide range of “segment neutral” policies 
that in other contexts have been identified to be important.  Such policies, for example, may 
include those that increase the absorptive capacity of firms (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990; Fu 2008), improve the level of human capital available to firms (Dunning 
1988; Cleeve et al. 2015), promote  public-private partnerships and “knowledge bridges” 
between different local ecosystems and/or universities (Mathews and Hu 2007; Corredoira and 
Mcdermott 2014), and/or help coordinate the activities of local actors (Thun 2006).  Examples of 
42 
 
each of these can be found in all of the sectors examined in this paper, including the “liberal” 
case of construction equipment (which had state organized technology transfer program in the 
1980s, specialized universities to train engineers, state-sponsored R&D units for core 
components and technologies, etc.).   
Although the evidence we present shows that development efforts in China have been 
most successful when the state has fostered growth in all segments and not been overly 
restrictive on the supply-side, recent policy initiatives such as the 12th Five Year Plan for Science 
and Industry and the Five Year Plan for National Strategic Emerging Industries demonstrate that 
China’s central government has drawn different lessons.  A central component of the recent 
strategies is a pronounced tilt towards domestic firms, often at the expense of participation of 
foreign firms, and the aggressive promotion of “indigenous” innovation and national champions 
in leading sectors.  Underlying this shift are views that earlier policies, including a relatively 
liberal environment with respect to FDI and foreign firms, have not been as successful as desired 
in enabling local (Chinese) firms to narrow the technological gap and compete with leading 
multinationals.  Our analysis suggests that factors other than foreign participation are keys to 
explaining these difficulties. 
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1 See, for example, the special section in World Development (2011, vol. 39, no. 7) on “The Role of Foreign 
Technology and Indigenous Innovation in the Emerging Economics” (Fu et al., 2011).  For a review of the extensive 
literature on the relationship between multinational firms and host countries see Meyer (2004). 
2 Quality here is simply a short hand for product (or service) attributes that consumers value and are willing to pay 
more for; consumers also differ in the value they put on these attributes. Higher quality is also costly for firms to 
produce, requiring some combination of better designs, superior intermediate inputs, and improved manufacturing 
processes. These costs differ among firms and will depend on each firm’s underlying capabilities, which reflect the 
know-how collectively held by groups of individuals within the firm (Sutton 2000).  Cost innovation, i.e. the ability 
to produce the same quality at lower cost, is an integral part of the same upgrading process.     
3 We are abstracting here from the role of horizontal product differentiation however some of the same forces we 
describe are also likely important in enabling a firm to differentiate its products from related varieties. 
4 For details on these dynamics in the case of China, see “China 2030:  Building a Modern, Harmonious, and 
Creative High-Income Society”, a joint report of the World Bank and the Development Research Center of China’s 
State Council. 
5 Calculations are based on the Chinese Industrial Census for 1995, 2004 and 2008 and UNCOMTRADE data. 
6 There is an extensive empirical literature examining the effect of horizontal and vertical spillovers in industry, of 
which Gorg and Greenaway (2004) is a good review.  In general, the results are mixed. For China, Du, Harrison and 
Jefferson (2012) find significant vertical linkages through both backward and forward linkages, but no horizontal 
linkages.  A possible shortcoming of the spillover literature is that it ignores the important interactions between FDI, 
and demand-side factors in the local economy in influencing the sign and size of the spillovers.  As we argue in this 
paper, upgrading by local firms requires that demand and supply conditions be complementary.   This is often not 
the case however, as explained below in autos and motorcycles.  In both sectors there has been significant FDI in 
China, but only modest upgrading by domestic firms.    
7 A firm might prefer ownership (i.e. FDI) to market transactions (i.e. licensing) due to structural market 
imperfections (e.g. the desire to achieve market power through internal economies of scale, knowledge advantages, 
etc.) or transaction-cost imperfections (e.g. the difficulty of protecting intellectual property or preventing 
opportunism). 
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8 WOFEs likely provide foreign firms the most powerful incentives to transfer knowhow locally, but all within the 
firm, and not to a Chinese partner, which is what the Chinese government was usually most concerned about. 
9 As Ling Chen (2014) argues in the case of Suzhou, when there is excessive policy preference for multinational 
firms (and hence entry), the technology gap may be too large for local firms to bridge.  Again, each rung of the 
ladder plays a crucial role. 
10 Between 2007 and 2013, a total of 81 interviews, each lasting roughly 1 hour, were conducted in the three sectors, 
including 25 OEM firms, 17 supply firms, and 1 dealership.  In Beijing, interviews also were conducted at the 
Development Research Council, the State Information Center (under the National Development Research Council), 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Industry, and the Ministry of Science and Technology.   
11 An alternative hypothesis for the variation in outcome in these three sectors is that the structures of the quality 
ladders differed, and consequently firms in sectors with less favourable opportunities for upgrading lobbied for 
protection.  Khandewal (2010) demonstrates that globally the quality ladders of the three sectors were similar in 
structure, and there is little reason to believe that this was not the case in China.   
12 Table 1 reports total sales in 1991 for motorcycles and autos and in 1997 for construction equipment.  Although 
this latter figure is six years later‐‐the earliest year for which we can obtain data‐‐it is clear that in the early 1990s 
all three sectors were in their infancy, and market demand small.  At this point in time, there was little reason for 
policymakers to believe that prospects were any brighter for construction equipment firms than for firms in the 
other two sectors, particularly given that countries such as Japan and Korea were successful in all three at 
comparable stages of development. 
13 Although explaining the divergence of state policy is beyond the scope of this paper, Brandt et al. (2012, revised 
2015) looks at the determinants of tariff rates in 1995 in the context of an examination of the effect of tariffs on 
productivity.  They find that on average, tariffs on capital goods (which would include construction equipment) and 
intermediate goods sectors  were 30 percentage points lower than they were on consumer goods (which would 
include autos and motorcycles).  One possible explanation is that customers of imported capital and intermediate 
goods were state firms, who were able to lobby for tariffs that would lower their purchasing costs (and increase 
profits).  An explanation of this sort, of course, would be exogenous to our argument.   
14 For each of these pieces of equipment, there are also distinct market segments. 
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15 By definition, domestic market sales are equal to total sales by firms in China minus exports plus imports. 
16 The sales price of Liugong’s premium wheel loader (the 856) was approximately RMB 450,000 in 2011 compared 
to RMB 350,000 for the basic model (the 5c).   
17 The Bernstein report detailed the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese firms:  “The Chinese are clearly making 
substantial progress in a number of areas— some OEMs can engineer bodies, suspension, electronics and interiors 
independently. There are now some highly skilled engineers in the Chinese OEMs with specific functional expertise.  
But almost all of our interviewees cited issues with Chinese OEMs being unable to integrate different components 
and systems, being unable to calibrate and utilize (expensively acquired) equipment and being unable — or 
unwilling — to properly nail down quality. They also highlighted that Chinese OEMs struggle to develop 
competitive engines (p.6).” 
18 Between 1997 and 2010, exports increased from less than 100,000 units to 11.4 million, an annual increase of 
35.5%, and go from representing only 1% of total motorcycle sales to 34.2%.  In 2011, exports soared to 42.3% of 
total sales. Conversely, domestic sales of firms producing in China fell from 99% to 57.7% of their total production. 
19 For 125 cc bikes, the average price falls from 4557 RMB to 3236, a fall of nearly thirty percent. The reduction is 
smaller for the 100-110 cc class, but this is primarily due to the increase in the number of 110 cc motorcycles in the 
group.  The only segment in which we observe an increase in prices is the less than 50 cc segment, which primarily 
reflects the increase of exports by Japanese-based JVs to Japan.  
20 Personnel and equipment was transferred from existing factories in Shanghai, and to a lesser extent Luoyang.   
21 In 2008, 50% of the sales of the leading wheel loader producer in China, Liugong, were based on a model 
originally derived from CAT designs.  Interview 072808.   
22 Implicit here is the fact that the costs of operating the machine include both the capital costs of the machine and 
the costs of the operator. 
23 In developed markets, wheel-loaders are generally designed for 98% utilization (i.e. the machine will run 22 hours 
a day), but a Chinese private entrepreneur might only demand 30-40% utilization. Global machine typically required 
servicing to be done by authorized outlets using authorized components, while the Chinese user demanded low-cost 
commodity components and servicing that could be done anywhere.   
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24 SOEs produced motorcycles as part of JVs and as independent manufacturers.  In some cases, we have not been 
able to break down the production between the two, which may result in a slight upward (downward) bias in the 
share of SOEs (FIEs) in 1997 of four to six percentage points.    
25 By 1990, there were more than 60 manufacturers in the sector, a majority of them SOEs, but total annual 
production was still only a million units (Automotive Industry of China, 2002). 
26 Small cars have also benefited from government subsidy programs during the last decade.  
27 These estimates are taken from select years of the China Statistical Yearbook.  
28 The rates of growth observed in domestic market sales over much of this period are low in several respects: First, 
by comparison to growth in domestic demand in heavy construction; second, by comparison to sales in related 
consumer durables such as autos, where domestic demand grew nearly 25 percent between 1991 and 2010; and third, 
what we would predict on the basis of estimates of the income elasticity of demand (~1.75) for motorcycles and per 
capita income growth in China (8 percent).  A fourth factor is the effect of falling tariffs and prices, which easily 
should have pushed annual rates of growth in domestic sales to over 20 percent. 
29 In contrast to autos, Japanese motorcycle OEM’s typically sourced through local domestic suppliers when they 
invested overseas rather than through Japanese suppliers that set up local production facilities. 
30 In 2001 and 2002, the profit rates of Chinese firms were negative, and R&D expenditures for the industry were 
declining (Ohara 2006:  105). 
31 The regulations on entry were articulated in the State Council “Notice on the Regulations of Controlling the 
Number of Passenger Car Manufactures,” and repeated in policy documents in 1989 and 1994 (Li 2009:  7).  In 
reality, the central government had difficulty preventing local governments from  supporting local firms, and the 
best it could do was prevent the expansion of small firms beyond their home jurisdiction.  It did so by having the 
security bureau refuse to issue licenses to vehicles that were not from an approved firm (Thun 2006:  59).  As a 
result, there continued to be a large number of firms, but the majority of these were small-scale.  
32 In addition to having the say over the foreign partner, the state also tightly oversaw the technology transfer 
agreements including the car models to be produced, import of capital equipment, and localization requirements. 
50 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
33 As an engineer in Shanghai Auto explained, when the firm established operations that were independent from its 
JVs, the processes were largely adapted from the JVs.  Interview 040313.  
34 In 1996, less than 20% of auto sales went to individuals (McKinsey 2003).  Weak demand from individuals might 
have been the result of lower per capita incomes at this stage rather than high prices, but this argument should not be 
overstated.   By the mid-1990s, there were already more than 100 million households living in Chinese cities.  
Conservatively, per capita incomes for households in the upper ten (five) percent of the distribution was more than 
10,000 (20,000) RMB, and total household incomes 3-4 times these levels. 
35 During this period, JVs were established by General Motors (1997), Honda (1997), Fiat (1999), Toyota (2002), 
Hyundai (2002), Nissan (2002), and Ford (2003). 
36 There are a few exceptions. Great Wall, a leader maker of SUVs, and one of the most successful of the private 
OEMs, has been the largest manufacturer of pick-ups in China the last 14 years.  SUVs and pick-ups share similar 
platforms. 
37 When the first wave of output from these firms hit the market in 2001 and 2002, there were rapid allegations of IP 
violations. Models of the two leading firms, Chery’s QQ and Fengyuan, and Geely’s Haoqing and Meerie, appeared 
to be based on a foreign platform and led to IP dispute.  See Fourin China Auto Weekly, “China’s Original 
Passenger Cars:  Local Initiative Sees a Flurry of New Models,” August 2, 2004.   
38 Reasons included the use of older technologies, lower quality standards, the elimination of expensive and non-
critical features and functions, and the use of less expensive engineers. Geely, for instance, was estimated to have 
spent approximately $250 per unit on R&D compared to approximately $1500 at Volkswagen and Toyota. 
(Warburton et al. 2013:  61). 
39 Due to the integral nature of the product technology, it has generally been assumed that an OEM must have the 
design knowledge that will allow it to be a systems integrator.  The outsourcing of design in China may be an 
obstacle to increasing quality, but it might also be an innovation that ultimately leads to much lower design costs 
than have been achieved in the past (and a source of competitive advantage) with in-house design skills.  A potential 
danger is that the external design houses develop the critical skills within the value chain, and hence have more 
leverage over the OEMs. 
40 As an indication of Chinese success in telecom equipment, Huawei overtook Ericsson to become the world’s 
largest supplier of telecommunications equipment in 2012.   
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41 A State Council document promulgated in 1989 actually called for limiting the number of foreign firms to only 
three, but it had little impact.  By 1995, there were a total of 7 JVs involving leading international telecoms 
producing in China.   
42 By the mid-1990s, localization at Shanghai Bell, for example, was in the vicinity of 70% (Harwitt, 2007). 
43 First, with proficiency in English much less common, a machine operator interface with a Chinese language 
screen menu was essential.  Second, the switches that were produced by the JVs were much less robust to problems 
in transmission lines and transmission quality, which were common in the lower-tier networks.  And third, foreign 
systems were designed around the assumption of low usage of individual lines, which was not the case in China.   
44 Goldwind is an exception, and is investing heavily in design as opposed to manufacturing capabilities. In this 
regard, the head of R&D said they aspire to be like Apple (Interview 102312).  
45 In addition to the familiar BRIC countries, this would include Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey (the 
“MINT” economies) and others. 
HC M A HC M A HC M A HC M A
1985 979,307 979,307
1991 1,250,396 81,044 1,250,396 134,264 789 54,009
1997 20,697 9,242,825 487,995 24,906 9,150,887 518,941 3,577 91,938 1,073 7,787 32,019
 
2003 103,648 14,754,513 2,037,865 131,115 11,732,824 2,138,033 1,174 3,021,689 2,849 28,641 103,017
 
2010 407,515 26,591,387 11,278,887 419,801 17,553,628 11,654,987 30,162 9,040,525 282,900 42,448 2,766 650,000
HC M A HC M A HC M A HC M A
1985‐1991 4.2% 4.2%
1991‐1997 39.6% 34.9% 39.3% 25.3% 5.3%
1997‐2003 30.8% 8.1% 26.9% 31.9% 4.2% 26.6% ‐16.9% 79.0% 17.7% 24.2%   21.5%
2003‐2010 21.6% 8.7% 27.7% 18.1% 5.8% 27.4% 59.0% 16.9% 92.9% 5.8%   30.1%
1997‐2010 25.8% 8.4% 27.3% 24.3% 5.0% 26.1% 17.8% 42.3% 53.5% 13.9%   26.1%
Total Sales by Firms in China Domestic Market Demand Exports Imports
Table 1: Sales, Market Demand, Exports and Imports  
Total Sales by Firms in China Domestic Market Demand Exports Imports
Annual Growth Rates  
Output Tariff ERP Output Tariff ERP Output Tariff ERP
1992 120 570 17 5 132 568
2000 59 227 14 30 62 261
2007 43 175 7 10 21 69
Note:  ERP is the effective rate of protection and is equal to: (ti – atj)/(1‐a), where ti and tj are the nominal 
tariffs on the final good and intermediate inputs, and a is the value of intermediates as a share of the value 
of the final good at international prices. 
Motorcycles Construction  Vehicles
Table 2: Sector Tariff Rates
 Displacement: cc
Sales
Market 
Share Sales
Market 
Share Sales
Market 
Share Sales
Market 
Share
1997
  Total 8,738,833 167,646 261,997 9,168,477
Foreign 1,051,044 12.0% 10,780 6.4% 105,603 40.3% 1,167,427 12.7%
State 5,818,744 66.6% 90,110 53.7% 119,936 45.8% 6,028,788 65.8%
  Collective‐Private 1,869,047 21.4%   66,756 39.8% 36,458 14%   1,972,261 21.5%
Collective 754,548 8.6% 47,443 28.3% 4,718 1.8% 806,709 8.8%
Private 1,114,500 12.8% 19,313 11.5% 31,740 12.1% 1,165,553 12.7%
Market Share 95.3% 1.8% 2.9%
2003
  Total 13,291,574 876,126 88,358 14,256,058
Foreign 3,578,719 26.9% 157,504 18.0% 6,672 7.6% 3,742,895 26.3%
State 5,092,806 38.3% 103,709 11.8% 9,309 10.5% 5,205,822 36.5%
Private 4,620,052 34.8% 614,914 70.2% 72,377 81.9% 5,307,341 37.2%
 
Market Share 93.2% 6.1% 0.6%
2010
Total 21,953,013 3,960,874 677,500 26,591,387
Foreign 4,664,982 21.2% 649,288 16.4% 14,247 2.1% 5,328,516 20.0%
State 8,998,617 41.0% 916,230 23.1% 154,403 22.8% 10,069,248 37.9%
Private 8,240,564 37.5% 2,444,211 61.7% 508,851 75.1% 11,193,624 42.1%
Market Share 82.6% 14.9% 2.5%
Table 3:  Motorcycle Sales by Market Segment and Ownership
50‐125 150 250+  Total
Engine Size
2000 Sales
Market 
Share Sales
Market 
Share Sales
Market 
Share Sales
Market 
Share
Total 290,717 288,734 30,543 609,994
Domestic 90,569 31.2% 13,584 4.7% 0 0.0% 104,153 17.1%
Foreign (JV) 200,148 68.8% 275,150 95.3% 30,543 100.0% 505,841 82.9%
Market Share
2010
Total 6,645,875 4,245,745 396,267 11,287,887
Private 1,818,393 27.4% 508,229 12.0% 30,859 7.8% 2,357,481 20.9%
State 1,011,445 15.2% 483,213 11.4% 7,314 1.8% 1,501,971 13.3%
Foreign 3,816,037 57.4% 3,254,303 76.6% 358,095 90.4% 7,428,435 65.8%
Market Share 58.9% 37.6% 3.5%
Table 4: Car Sales by Market Segment and Ownership
< = 1.6 1.6<L<=2.5 > 2.5. Total
47.7% 47.3% 5.0%
Supply Side Demand Side
Construction
Few restrictions on entry, 
ownership or M&A
Low tariffs, policies 
on demand are
Equipment
     
activity in any segment 
Few restrictions in 
any segment
     
segment neutral 
High tariffs increase prices 
in all segment
Motorcycles
Restrictions on motorcycle 
use in urban areas and 
highways lowers demand 
in high‐end
Automotive
(pre‐WTO)
High tariffs increase 
Prices in all segments.
High restrictions on entry 
and ownership limit private 
sector growth in low‐end; focus 
on JVs limits licensing deals
Key:  Shading indicates policies whose impact is not segment neutral.
Restrictions on WOFEs limit 
high‐end tech transfer
Figure 1:  Variation in policy across sectors
Low Middle                     High
Construction
Equipment Wheel Loaders              Large W‐Loaders           Excavatorsand Mini‐Ex
Motorcycles
Automotive
50 to 125 cc 150 cc 250+ cc 
(pre‐WTO) < = 1.6L    1.6L<=2.5L                   >2.5L
Key: Shaded boxes indicate missing market segment
Figure 2: Proxy measures of segmentation within sectors
            
              
Wheel loaders in 1999 (inner circle) Excavators in 1999 (inner circle)       
and 2010 (outer circle)      and 2010 (outer circle)
9% 25% 11%27%
91%75% % 73%
FIE Domestic
89
FIE Domestic   
Note:  The FIE expansion in market share in wheel loaders is largely a result of acquisitions of Chinese firms.
Figure 3: Market share in construction equipment
Source:  China Construction Equipment Yearbooks.
            
                          
                          
                          
  Source:  Data for 1995 from McKinsey; Data for 2001 and 2006 from CATARC 
 
Figure 4:  Car size, prices, and sales in 1995, 2001, and 2006 
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